The Western Approach to Warfare - Dominating the Narrative Overpowers Reality

The Evolution of Infowar

Propaganda and deception have always been integral components of warfare. What's novel in the current era is that information warfare is no longer just a supporting element of broader war objectives, but has become an objective in itself.

Western societies have come to prioritize controlling the dominant narrative, painting opposing viewpoints as clumsy, discordant, and extremist, over addressing actual facts. In this perspective, achieving a virtual 'victory' is more significant than the 'real' reality.

Consequently, warfare becomes more about enforcing ideological alignment across a global alliance through compliant media, rather than ensuring sufficient manufacturing capacity to sustain military objectives. The creation of an imagined 'reality' has taken precedence over shaping the ground reality.

The Risks of False Realities

This approach, which relies on societal alignment both domestically and internationally, can lead to entrapment in false realities and expectations. When it becomes necessary to change course, it can be nearly impossible due to the rigid public sentiment created by the imposed alignment. The ability of a state to adapt to unfolding events becomes restricted, and the interpretation of facts on the ground veers towards political correctness and away from reality.

The cumulative effect of a 'winning virtual narrative' carries the risk of inadvertently sliding towards 'real war'.

The Kursk Incursion: A Case Study

An example of this is the NATO-led and equipped incursion into the symbolically significant Kursk Oblast. The narrative appeal of Ukraine 'taking the war to Russia' is clear from a Western perspective.

If Ukrainian forces had managed to capture the Kursk Nuclear Power Station, they would have gained a significant bargaining chip, potentially diverting Russian forces from the collapsing Ukrainian 'Line' in Donbas.

Western media was prepared to portray President Putin as "paralyzed" by the surprise incursion and "unsteady" due to anxiety that the Russian public would turn against him in their anger at the humiliation.

Bill Burns, head of the CIA, suggested that "Russia would offer no concessions on Ukraine, until Putin’s over-confidence was challenged, and Ukraine could show strength". Other U.S. officials added that the Kursk incursion alone would not bring Russia to the negotiating table; it would be necessary to build on the Kursk operation with other daring operations to unsettle Moscow.

The overall aim was to depict Russia as fragile and vulnerable, in line with the narrative that Russia could disintegrate at any moment, leaving the West as the victor.

However, the Kursk incursion was a significant gamble by NATO, wagering Ukraine's military reserves and armor on the hope that a fleeting success in Kursk would overturn the strategic balance. The gamble failed, and the stakes were lost.

The Problem with 'Winning Narratives'

This Kursk episode illustrates the Western issue with 'winning narratives': they are inherently flawed as they are based on emotionalism and disregard argumentation. They are inevitably simplistic and designed to fuel a common societal alignment. This means that across mainstream media, business, federal agencies, NGOs, and the security sector, all should adhere to opposing all 'extremisms' threatening 'our democracy'.

This objective in itself necessitates that the narrative be simple and relatively uncontroversial: 'Our Democracy, Our Values, and Our Consensus'. The Democratic National Convention, for instance, emphasizes 'Joy', 'moving Forward', and 'opposing weirdness' as key messages. While these memes may seem banal, they are energized not so much by their content, but by the deliberate Hollywood setting lending them glamour and excitement.

It's not difficult to see how this one-dimensional zeitgeist may have contributed to the U.S. and its allies' misinterpretation of the impact of the Kursk 'daring adventure' on ordinary Russians.

The Historical Significance of Kursk

'Kursk' carries historical significance. In 1943, Germany invaded Russia in Kursk to divert from its own losses, with Germany ultimately defeated at the Battle of Kursk. The return of German military equipment to the vicinity of Kursk must have been shocking; the current battlefield around the town of Sudzha is precisely the spot where, in 1943, the Soviet 38th and 40th armies prepared for a counteroffensive against the German 4th Army.

Over the centuries, Russia has been variously attacked on its vulnerable flank from the West. More recently by Napoleon and Hitler. Unsurprisingly, Russians are acutely sensitive to this bloody history. Did Bill Burns and others consider this? Did they think that NATO invading Russia itself would make Putin feel 'challenged', and that with one more push, he would capitulate and agree to a 'frozen' outcome in Ukraine – with the latter joining NATO? Perhaps they did.

Ultimately the message that western services sent was that the West (NATO) is coming for Russia. This is the meaning of deliberately choosing Kursk. Reading the implications of Bill Burns' message suggests preparation for war with NATO.

The Difference Between Deception and 'Winning Narratives'

It's important to clarify that this type of 'winning narrative' surrounding Kursk is neither deceit nor feint. The Minsk Accords were examples of deceit, but they were deceits grounded in rational strategy. The Minsk deceits were intended to buy the West time to further Ukraine’s militarization – before attacking the Donbas. The deceit worked, but only at the cost of a rupture of trust between Russia and the West. The Minsk deceits also hastened an end to the 200-year era of the westernization of Russia.

Kursk, on the other hand, is a different matter. It is based on the ideas of western exceptionalism. The West sees itself as adhering to 'the right side of History'. 'Winning narratives' essentially assert – in secular terms – the inevitability of the western eschatological Mission for global redemption and convergence. In this new narrative context, facts-on-the-ground become mere annoyances, and not realities that must be taken into account.

This is their Achilles’ Heel.

The DNC Convention and the New Antithesis

The DNC convention in Chicago, however, highlighted another concern:

Just as the hegemonic West arose out of the Cold War era shaped and invigorated through dialectic opposition to communism (in the western mythology), so we see today, a (claimed) totalizing 'extremism' (whether of MAGA mode; or of the external variety: Iran, Russia, etc.) – posed in Chicago in a similar Hegelian dialectic opposition to the former capitalism versus communism; but in today's case, it is "extremism" in conflict with "Our Democracy".

The DNC Chicago narrative-thesis is itself a tautology of identity differentiation posing as 'togetherness' under a diversity banner and in conflict with 'whiteness' and 'extremism'. 'Extremism' is effectively being set up as the successor to the former Cold War antithesis – communism.

The Chicago 'back-room' may be imagining that a confrontation with extremism – writ widely – will again, as it did in the post-Cold War era, yield an American rejuvenation. Which is to say that a conflict with Iran, Russia, and China (in a different way) may come onto the agenda. The telltale signs are there (plus the West’s need for a re-set of its economy, which war regularly provides).

The Consequences of the Kursk Ploy

The Kursk ploy probably seemed clever and audacious to London and Washington. Yet what was the result? It achieved neither the objective of taking Kursk NPP, nor of diverting Russian troops from the Contact Line. The Ukrainian presence in the Kursk Oblast will be eliminated.

What it did do, however, was put an end to all prospects of an eventual negotiated settlement in Ukraine. Distrust of the U.S. in Russia is now absolute. It has made Moscow more determined to prosecute the special operation to conclusion. The visible German equipment in Kursk has resurrected old ghosts, and solidified awareness of the hostile western intentions toward Russia.

'Never again' is the unspoken response.

Bottom Line

In conclusion, the Western approach to warfare, which prioritizes controlling the narrative over addressing the actual facts on the ground, carries inherent risks. As the Kursk incursion illustrates, such an approach can lead to miscalculations and unintended consequences, potentially escalating conflicts rather than resolving them. It raises the question of whether 'winning narratives' are truly winning, or if they are merely illusions that mask the harsh realities of war.

What are your thoughts on this matter? Do you think the Western approach to warfare is effective or flawed? Share this article with your friends and join the conversation.

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